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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROYAL STREET LAND COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
WILLIAM J. REED and 
PATSY REED, 
Defendants-Respondents 
No. 19480 
Royal Street Land Company, the plaintiff in the 
District Court and the appellant herein, respectfully submits 
this Opening Brief, by and through its counsel of record. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment entered by 
District Judge Homer Wilkinson of the Third Judicial District 
Court for Summit County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The Summary Judgment from which Royal Street appeals 
stems from rulings made by District Judge Homer Wilkinson upon 
a Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of William J. 
Reed and Patsy Reed, defendants in the District Court and the 
respondents herein, which Motion, though previously denied, was 
purportedly renewedo, and from rulings upon a Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed by Royal Street. The said Summary Judgment 
granted the Reeds' renewed Motion and denied Royal Street's 
Motion. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Royal Street asks that this Court reverse the Summary 
Judgment appealed from and direct that the District Court enter 
judgment against the Reeds in favor of Royal Street. In the 
alternative, Royal Street asks that this Court remand this case 
to the District Court for further proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Royal Street commenced this action on or about October 
23, 1979 with the filing of a Complaint (R. 001-004) seeking to 
quiet title to the following described real property situated 
in Summit County, Utah against the Reeds and First Security 
Bank of Utah, N.A.: 
BEGINNING at a point South 748.93 feet and East 
540.14 feet from the West 1/4 corner of Section 
15, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian; thence North ll°44f30" East 
246.00 along an old fence line to the South Right 
of Way line of the ONTARIO RR SPUR; thence South 
88°19?30ff East 107.91 feet along said Right of 
Way; thence South 6°22f30M West 222.80 feet along 
an old fence line to existing road; thence South 
82°59'30" West 134.210 feet along road to point 
of BEGINNING. 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. did not respond to the 
Complaint and its default was duly entered on December 19, 
1979. (R. 014). The Reeds answered the Complaint asserting, 
inter alia, the defense of title by adverse possession and 
the defense that Section 78-12-5 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. 
Vol. 9A 1977) barred Royal Street's action because of the 
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history of possession by the Reeds and their tenants and 
predecessors. (R. 019-021). 
A period of discovery between Royal Street and the 
Reeds then ensued. (See R. 016-018, 024-031, 032-046, 
047-051, 053-067, 068-069, 071-073, and 074-094). 
In May of 1982, the Reeds filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment with supporting papers, including several affidavits. 
(R. 103-105, 106-118, 119-124, 125-153, 154-156, 157-165, and 
167-192). This Motion essentially conceded Royal Street's 
record title to the surface estate. (See, e.g., R. 167-173 
and 194-196). The focus of the Motion was therefore upon 
establishing title to the surface estate through proof of the 
occupation and use of the property by the Reeds and their 
tenants and predecessors under instruments purportedly 
providing some color of title, as opposed to actual legal 
title, and through evidence and argument with respect to the 
assessment and payment of taxes. (See, e.g., R. 173-192). 
Royal Street responded to the Reeds' Motion with an affidavit 
and a lengthy Memorandum. (R. 194-220 and 221-243). 
A hearing was held on the Reeds' Motion on July 6, 
1982 (R. 244-245, 246, and 247), at which time it was made to 
appear that the real property comprised a part of certain 
patented millsites known as the Trump Millsite, the Goodell 
Millsite, and the Olive Branch Millsite. (See, e.g., R. 
221). Royal Street's interest in this real property was 
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acquired by Royal Street from Greater Park City Company 
("Greater Park") on October 14, 1975 as a part of a larger 
tract consisting of approximately 40 acres. (See, e.g. , R. 
222 and 224-227). Greater Park had, in turn, acquired its 
interest in this 40 acre tract from United Park City Mines 
Company ("United Park") on October 11, 1975. (See, e.g., R. 
222 and 228-231). Royal Street's title to the real property 
traced through the foregoing and other mesne conveyances to the 
patents under which the Trump Millsite, the Goodell Millsite, 
and the Olive Branch Millsite were patented. (See, e.g., R. 
222 and 232-237). Accordingly, Royal Street had the record 
title and claimed the exclusive right to possession of the 
surface estate in the real property. (See, e.g., R. 195). 
From all that appeared, title to the mineral estate in the real 
property remained in United Park, which excepted and reserved 
the mineral estate when it conveyed the 40 acre tract to 
Greater Park in 1975. (R. 195). 
Prior to 1962, there was no evidence of the existence 
of any instrument purporting to reflect the existence of title 
to the real property in the Reeds or anyone through whom they 
purported to claim. The evidence, rather, was that sometime 
beginning in the laite 1920fs, one William Lawry, a shift boss 
for the Park Utah Consolidated Mining Company, Judge Mine 
Division, built a house and double garage and erected other 
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improvements upon the property. (R. 155). In 1946, the house 
and garage were deeded by Mr. Lawry and his wife to one Ray L. 
Pedersen. (R. 158 and 161). Mr. Pedersen died in 1954 and, 
thereafter, Mr. Pedersen1s widow "[intending] to establish . . . 
an exclusive ownership right to the house . . . purchased the 
house by payment of past due taxes at a tax sale and received 
title to the house by Quit Claim Deed from Summit County dated 
June 6, 1955 . . . ." (R. 158 and 162; emphasis supplied). In 
1956, Mr. Pedersen's widow filed a document titled "Declaration 
of Homestead1' with the Summit County Recorder's Office, 
evidently out of some concern over taxes. (R. 158, 160, and 
4 
163-164). This "Declaration of Homestead" referred only to 
"[t]he ninth house on the South side of Deer Valley, Park 
City, Utah." (R. 163-164; emphasis supplied). The first 
instrument in the Reeds' "chain of title" purporting to reflect 
title to the real property rather than merely the house or 
garage thereon is a Quit Claim Deed to the Reeds from Edith 
Rasband, a/k/a Edith Pedersen, dated August 13, 1963, 
purporting to convey all of grantor's right, title, and 
interest in the property, describing it as follows: 
"House No. 570, with double garage, being the 
ninth (9th) house on the rear, South side of Deer 
Valley, Park City, Utah, including all land 
surrounding the house between the lateral fence 
lines and extending from the road in front to the 
road in the rear." (R. 107, 113, and 165). 
It was this instrument upon which the Reeds principally relied 
for color of title. (R. 173-174). From all that appeared, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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there was no other instrument in the Reeds' "chain of title" 
except for a Quit Claim Deed from the Reeds to themselves dated 
August 8, 1973, which utilized a metes and bounds description 
identical to that appearing in Royal Street's original 
Complaint. (R. 108 and 114-115). This 1973 Quit Claim Deed is 
the only instrument in the Reeds' "chain of title" that employs 
the metes and bounds description appearing in Royal Street's 
original Complaint or, for that matter, any metes and bounds 
description. 
The evidence with regard to the assessment and payment 
of taxes was, of course, of central importance to the 
determination of the issues raised by the Reeds' Motion and is 
best understood with the facts and sequence of events set forth 
above in mind. 
There was no evidence that the Reeds or anyone through 
whom they claim paid any taxes prior to 1955 or 1956. Edith 
Rasband, a/k/a Edith Pedersen, evidently "paid all taxes 
assessed against the home and improvements" between 1955 or 
1956 and 1962, but appears not to have paid or even to have 
been aware of "taxes being assessed against the surrounding 
real property." (R. 169; emphasis supplied). The Reeds 
evidently paid taxes assessed by Summit County during the years 
1962 to 1973, but those taxes were assessed against property 
described as "9th House S. Side Deer Valley PC House #570 with 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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i 
double garage." (R. 110 and 117). The Summit County tax 
notices for the years 1962 to 1973 disclose on their face that 
the assessment was made only on buildings or improvements and 
not on the real property itself. (See, e.g., R. 117). It 
was not until 1973, the year in which the Reeds made the Quit 
Claim Deed to themselves which contained a metes and bounds 
property description identical to that appearing in Royal 
Street's original Complaint, that the Summit County tax notices 
directed to the Reeds began to reflect an assessment of the 
real property designated by the said metes and bounds 
description in addition to a house and garage. (R. 110 and 
118). The Reeds evidently paid these taxes for only six (6) 
years -- 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, and 1978 -- before the 
commencement of this action. (R. 62-63). The Reeds did not 
claim to have paid the 1979 taxes until October 31, 1979. (R. 
63). This action was filed on October 23, 1979 -- before the 
Reeds claimed to have paid the 1979 taxes. Consequently, there 
was never a seven (7) year period prior to the commencement of 
this action in which taxes were shown to have been assessed 
against the real property described in Royal Street's original 
Complaint and to have been paid by the Reeds or their 
predecessors. 
Furthermore, the evidence, including an Affidavit of 
John Stewart submitted by the Reeds, disclosed that between at 
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least 1939 and through 1977 taxes were assessed by the State 
Tax Conunission "for both the surface and mineral rights of the 
Goodell, Olive Branch, and Trump Millsites", of which the real 
property is a part. (R. 120 and 122-124; emphasis supplied. 
See also R. 74-76). The Reeds did not claim to have paid any 
of these taxes and, indeed, it appeared that they were paid 
through 1976 by United Park and its predecessors. (R. 74-76). 
The surface and the mineral estate in the Trump 
Millsite, the Goodell Millsite, and the Olive Branch Millsite 
were considered to have been severed for the purposes of State 
taxation in 1977 (R. 121), presumably due to the prior sale by 
United Park of the surface estate in the 40 acre tract now 
owned by Royal Street. Thereafter, the State taxes on the 
mineral estate were assessed to and paid by United Park. (R. 
74-76). Taxes on the surface estate in the 40 acre tract 
should have been assessed to Royal Street from at least 1977, 
but were finally assessed and paid by Royal Street through 1980 
in 1980. (R. 222-223). Thus, it was not until 1977 that the 
State Tax Commission ceased taxing both the surface and the 
mineral estate in the real property and recognized the 
authority of Summit County to tax the surface estate. 
Moreover, at least part of the surface estate in the 40 acre 
tract was taxed twice for each of the years since 1976; the 
surface estate in the entire 40 acre tract was taxed to Royal 
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Street and that portion of the tract described by the metes and 
bounds description appearing in Royal Street's original 
Complaint was taxed to the Reeds. 
Based upon the foregoing, Royal Street urged, among 
other things, that the evidence failed to show that the Reeds 
or their predecessors had "for seven years continuously . . . 
paid all taxes which had been levied and assessed upon [the] 
land according to lawM as required to establish title by 
adverse possession under Section 78-12-12 Utah Code Annotated 
(Repl. Vol. 9A 1977) (emphasis supplied). (See, e.g., R. 
201-202). 
The Reeds raised their claim that the action was 
barred by Section 78-12-5 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 9A 
1977) at the July 6, 1982 hearing. (R. 247). Royal Street 
thereafter briefed this issue pursuant to leave granted for 
that purpose. (R. 247-251). Royal Street urged, in this 
regard, that the Reeds' argument misconceived the meaning and 
purpose of Section 78-12-5. (R. 237-241 and 259-264). 
On August 6, 1982, the District Court entered a minute 
order denying the Reeds1 Motion. (R. 273). A formal Order 
denying the Motion was thereafter submitted and entered. (R. 
304-306). 
0, 
On or about August 16, 1982, Royal Street filed a 
Motion for Full or Partial Summary Judgment. (R. 277-279). 
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This Motion essentially urged that the denial of the Reeds' 
Motion required that summary judgment be granted in favor of 
Royal Street. (R. 280-283). A hearing was held on this Motion 
on August 30, 1982. (R. 284 and 285). 
At the August 30, 1982 hearing, counsel for the 
parties agreed that the trial set for October of 1982 could be 
stricken and the case decided upon the materials in the 
District Court's file. (R. 285). At this hearing, the Reeds 
filed a conclusory Second Affidavit of John Stewart, which was 
basically to the same effect as Mr. Stewart's prior affidavit 
and specifically reiterated that according to the records of 
the State Tax Commission, the taxes assessed by the State Tax 
Commission on the Goodell, Olive Branch, and Trump Millsites 
were upon both the surface and the mineral estate of the said 
claims. (R. 285 and 291-295; compare R. 119-124).1 
However, based upon the said Second Affidavit, the Reeds 
purported to renew their prior Motion for Summary Judgment. 
1. The Second Affidavit essentially expanded upon the 
prior Affidavit by including a hypothetical discussion of the 
taxation of nonmining improvements to or uses of the surface 
estate of mining claims. This subject matter is treated infra 
at pages 25 through 29 and footnote 7. The Second Affidavit 
also contained a conclusory and hypothetical discussion of the 
State's taxing scheme as applied to mining claims. This taxing 
scheme is examined infra at pages 25 through 34. As urged 
before the District Court, the statutes establishing that 
scheme and the case law concerning it obviously control to the 
extent, if any, that they may be inconsistent with Mr. 
Stewart's views. (See R. 289). 
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(R. 285). The District Court took the matter under 
advisement. (R. 285). Further memoranda were submitted. 
(See, e.g., R. 286-290). 
On November 19, 1982, the District Court entered a 
minute order denying Royal Street's Motion and granting the 
Reeds1 renewed Motion. (R. 307). 
In the process of preparing a judgment, counsel for 
the parties discovered that the description utilized in Royal 
Street's original Complaint failed to describe the property to 
which the Reeds actually claimed title by adverse possession 
and, instead, described other real property near by but 
separate and distinct from that property. (See, e.g., R. 319 
and 321-327). This error and corresponding references in the 
record were eventually corrected by the adoption by the 
District Court on September 8, 1983 of a Stipulation concerning 
o 
these matters. (R. 348-352). 
The Reeds thereafter submitted a form of Summary 
Judgment. (R. 346 and 353-356). Royal Street objected to this 
2 The District Court's Order adopting the said 
Stipulation provided as follows: 
"Upon motion, pursuant to stipulation, and good 
cause therefor appearing, it is hereby 
"ORDERED that Royal Street Land Company's 
Complaint is deemed amended nunc pro tunc to delete 
the legal description now contained therein and to 
substitute therefor the following described real 
property located in Summit County, State of Utah: 
(CONTINUED ON PAGE 12) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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proposed form upon several grounds, including its incorporation 
of certain purported findings, the fact that the change of 
description made it clear that the Reeds had never paid any 
taxes on the property that they actually claimed, and the fact 
that a portion of the property actually claimed by the Reeds 
had previously been dedicated by Royal Street to Park City as a 
roadway. (R. 331, 341, and 342-345). The Summary Judgment 
eventually entered by the District Court struck the purported 
FOOTNOTE 2 CONTINUED FROM PAGE 11: 
Beginning at a point which is South 748.63 feet and 
East 449.63 feet from the East Quarter corner of 
Section 16, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian; thence North 12°l4f40" East along 
an old fence line 246.08 feet to the south Right of 
Way line of the Ontario RR Spur; thence South 
88°27?52" East along said Right of Way Spur 108.60 
feet; thence South 6°58f30" West along an old fence 
line 222.80 feet to the north line of an existing 
road; thence South 82°59f47" West along said north 
line 134.70 feet to the point of beginning. Basis of 
Bearing is the easterly line of the Southeast Quarter 
of said Section 16, which bears South 0°30tlltf West. 
Contains 0.6340 acres, more or less. 
and it is 
FURTHER ORDERED that the legal description set forth 
above be deemed the property which is the subject of 
all previous pleadings and proceedings in this matter 
and, unless the context otherwise requires, any 
reference in previous pleadings submitted to the court 
or in rulings, orders or other decisions by the court 
to the "property", the "subject " property, the 
"disputed" property and so on be deemed to be directed 
to the property, the legal description of which 
appears above." 
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findings, but was otherwise as originally submitted by the 
Reeds. (R. 353-360). 
This appeal followed. (R. 362-363). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE REEDS1 
RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN DENY-
ING ROYAL STREET'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The Reeds do not dispute that Royal Street has record 
title to the surface estate of the property at issue in this 
case. Their only claim is (a) that they have acquired title to 
the surface estate by adverse possession or (b) that Royal 
Street's action is barred by Section 78-12-5 Utah Code 
Annotated (Repl. Vol. 9A 1977) because of the history of 
possession by the Reeds and their tenants and predecessors. If 
the Reeds have not established either of these claims as a 
matter of law, as the District Court originally held in denying 
the Reeds' Motion for Summary Judgment, it necessarily follows 
that the District Court erred in later granting the Reeds' 
renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. This portion of the 
Opening Brief urges that the Reeds have not established either 
of their claims and that, consequently, the Summary Judgment 
appealed from must be reversed and the District Court must be 
directed to enter judgment against the Reeds and in favor of 
Royal Street. 
The determinative issues with respect to the Reeds' 
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claim that they have acquired title by adverse possession 
concern the assessment and payment of taxes. In that regard, 
Section 78-12-12 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 9A 1977) 
provides, in pertinent part, that: 
"In no case, shall adverse possession be 
considered established . . . unless it shall be 
shown that the land has been occupied and claimed 
for seven years continuously, and that the party, 
his predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes 
which have been levied and assessed upon such 
land according to law." 
As discussed in Part "A" of this portion of this Opening Brief, 
the evidence discloses that the Reeds have not and cannot make 
this showing. The only taxes that the Reeds were shown to have 
paid or that were shown to have been paid by their predecessors 
prior to 1973 were Summit County taxes on buildings or 
improvements, not on land. The Summit County taxes paid by the 
Reeds from 1973 through 1978 did include an assessment of the 
real property described in Royal Street's original Complaint, 
but the Reeds had not paid such taxes for a full seven (7) 
years when this action was commenced on October 23, 1979. 
Moreover, the Stipulation approved by the District Court on 
September 8, 1983 establishes that the property described in 
Royal Street's original Complaint was not the land to which the 
Reeds actually claimed title by adverse possession. The 
evidence thus disclosed that the Reeds never paid any taxes on 
the land in issue, let alone "all" such taxes. Indeed, the 
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evidence disclosed that taxes were assessed by the State Tax 
Commission upon the surface estate of the land in issue since 
at least 1939 and that all such taxes were paid, but not by the 
Reeds. 
The Reeds' claim that Royal Street's action is barred 
because of the history of possession by the Reeds and their 
tenants and predecessors is based upon Section 78-12-5 Utah 
Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 9A 1977). As discussed in part "B" 
of this portion of this Opening Brief, this statute cannot 
properly be construed to bar this action. Indeed, the District 
Court must have so held in originally denying the Reeds' Motion 
for Summary Judgment and there is nothing to suggest that the 
District Court changed its mind on this particular point in 
later granting the Reeds' renewed Motion for Summary Judgment 
and denying Royal Street's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
It is, of course, sufficient for present purposes to 
observe that the Reeds cannot prevail as a matter of law. It 
bears noting, however, that there is considerable equity in 
this result. The Reeds appear to have acquired only certain 
buildings and improvements upon the real property that is the 
subject of this action -- and that for nominal consideration. 
They have evidently occupied and used those buildings and 
improvements and used the real property in issue for most of 
the time since 1962. In that time, the Reeds paid nothing to 
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Royal Street or its predecessors. Furthermore, they derived an 
undetermined sum from tenants through rentals. In the years 
since 1962, the Reeds paid an aggregate of no more than several 
hundred dollars in Summit County taxes, only a small portion of 
which were taxes on any real property. Throughout the period 
of their occupancy, the Reeds claim to have expended no more 
than about $20,000.00 for improvements to the property. (R. 
111). In short, the Reeds have had the benefit of the 
buildings and improvements and the use of the surface of the 
property in issue for more than twenty (20) years at an 
exceedingly modest cost to themselves and, possibly, at some 
net profit. There is no compelling equity in their claim that 
they should, in light of these facts, be adjudged to have title 
to the property as well. Moreover, even though they cannot 
establish title, the Reeds may be entitled to recover the value 
of the buildings and other improvements as occupying 
claimants. See Section 57-6-1 et seq. Utah Code Annotated 
(Repl. Vol. 6B 1974). 
A. THE EVIDENCE DISCLOSES THAT THE REEDS DID NOT 
SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 78-12-12 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (REPL. VOL. 9A 1977) 
1. The Payment by the Reeds or Their Predecessors of 
Taxes Assessed by Summit County on Buildings or 
Improvements Prior to 1973 Does Not Constitute 
the Payment of Taxes on "Land" as Required by 
Section 78-12-12. 
Section 78-12-12 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 9A 
1977) provides, in pertinent part, that: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"In no case shall adverse possession be 
considered established . . . unless it shall be 
shown that the land has been occupied and 
claimed for seven years continuously, and that 
the party, his predecessors and grantors have 
paid all taxes which have been levied and 
assessed upon such land according to law." 
(Emphasis supplied). 
As previously noted, the only taxes shown to have been 
assessed by Summit County and paid by the Reeds prior to 1973 
were taxes assessed on buildings or improvements and not taxes 
on land. The payment of such taxes does not qualify as the 
payment of taxes for purposes of Section 78-12-12. See, 
e.g., Homeowners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 
221-222, 141 P.2d 160, 167 (1943): 
"Some effort was made to show that taxes 
were paid on the disputed tract by Moses W. 
Beckstead, grantor of plaintiff, by reason of the 
fact that improvements identified as a house and 
other buildings were assessed to Moses W. 
Beckstead and plaintiff . . . However, 104-2-12, 
R.S.U. 1933 provides: ?In no case shall adverse 
possession be considered established . . . unless 
it shall be shown that the land has been 
occupied and claimed for the period of seven 
years continuously, and that the party, his 
predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes 
which have been levied and assessed upon such 
land according to law.*" (Emphasis in original). 
The memoranda submitted to the District Court by the Reeds in 
effect concede this point. (See, e.g., R. 186). 
2. The Payment by the Reeds of Taxes Assessed by 
Summit County from 1973 through 1978 Also 
Does Not Satisfy the Requirements of Section 
78-12-12. 
By virtue of Section 78-12-12 Utah Code Annotated 
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(Repl. Vol. 9A 1977), claimants to title by adverse possession 
must show, among other things, that they or their predecessors 
paid all taxes lawfully levied and assessed upon the real 
property to which they seek to establish title for an 
uninterrupted period of seven (7) years. See, e.g., 
Christensen v. Munster, 1 Utah 2d 335, 266 P.2d 756 (1954); 
Homeowners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, supra, 105 Utah at 220, 141 
P.2d at 166; Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman, 47 Utah 165, 170, 152 
P. 178, 179 (1915). 
Summit County first started to assess taxes to the 
Reeds upon a real property description in 1973. The Reeds 
evidently paid these taxes, but had not paid them for a full 
seven (7) years before this action was commenced on October 23, 
1979. The requirements of Section 78-12-12 are not satisfied 
under these circumstances. See, e.g., Christensen v. 
Munster, supra; Homeowners1 Loan Corp. v. Dudley, supra; 
Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman, supra. The Reeds also appear to 
have conceded this point. (See, e.g., R. 186). 
Furthermore, the real property description upon which 
Summit County assessed taxes to the Reeds was the same 
description as that utilized in Royal Street's original 
Complaint. The Stipulation approved by the District Court on 
September 8, 1983 establishes that that property was not the 
property to which the Reeds actually claimed title. 
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The evidence thus discloses that the Reeds paid no 
taxes upon the real property in issue. 
3. Taxes Were Assessed Upon the Real Property in 
Issue, But Such Taxes Were Paid by Royal Street 
or Its Predecessors and Not by the Reeds. 
In 1980, Summit County assessed the surface estate in 
the real property in issue to Royal Street for the years 1977, 
1978, 1979, and 1980, along with the surface estate in the 
remainder of the 40 acre tract. These taxes were paid in 1980 
by Royal Street, not by the Reeds. 
Furthermore, there is no dispute but that between at 
least 1939 and through 1977 taxes were assessed by the State 
Tax Commission "for both the surface and mineral rights of the 
Goodell, Olive Branch, and Trump Millsites", of which the real 
property in issue is a part. (R. 120 and 122-124; emphasis 
3. Corrective assessments of this type are expressly 
authorized by Section 57-5-17 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 
6B 1974), which provides that: 
" Any property discovered by the assessor to have 
escaped assessment may be assessed at any time as far 
back as five years prior to the time of discovery, and 
the assessor shall enter such assessments on the tax 
rolls in the hands of the county treasurer or 
elsewhere, and when so assessed shall be reported by 
the assessor to the county auditor, if made after the 
assessment book has been delivered to the county 
treasurer, and the auditor shall charge the county 
assessor with the taxes on such property, and the 
assessor shall give notice to the person assessed 
therewith and the assessor shall forthwith proceed to 
secure or collect the taxes as provided in chapter 10 
of this title." 
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supplied. See also R. 74-76). It did so pursuant to Section 
59-5-57 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 6B 1974) and, 
particularly, that part thereof which provides for the 
assessment at $5.00 per acre of ,f[a]ll metalliferous mines and 
mining claims. . . ." (Emphasis supplied). The fact that 
these taxes were assessed to and paid by Royal Street's 
predecessors itself precludes the acquisition of title by 
adverse possession by the Reeds. Because the Reeds did not pay 
these taxes they failed to pay "all" taxes lawfully assessed 
against the property as required by Section 78-12-12 Utah Code 
Annotated (Repl. Vol. 9A 1977). 
Utah Copper Co. v. Chandler, 45 Utah 85, 142 P. 1119 
(1914) appears to be the first reported Utah decision involving 
an attempt by parties who had not paid any State assessed taxes 
to establish title by adverse possession to portions of the 
surface estate in mining claims taxed by the State to the 
mining company that was the record owner of the claims. 
However, Chandler was submitted and decided upon the basis of 
an agreed statement of facts that renders the case of no 
precedental value for purposes of this case. 
The plaintiff in Chandler was the record owner of 
Mirror Lode Mining Claim in Bingham Canyon. The State assessed 
taxes upon the mining claim to the plaintiff and the plaintiff 
paid those taxes. The defendants claimed the surface estate in 
two lots situated upon the mining claim by adverse possession. 
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The defendants evidently paid all taxes that were assessed to 
them by name and supposed that these taxes, which were 
presumably county taxes, included taxes upon the lots and 
improvements thereon. However, it was agreed that the lots and 
improvements were not "by the assessment roll or tax records 
described with sufficient certainty to identify the same" and 
was further agreed as follows: 
"It is agreed that the assessments upon the 
Mirror Lode Mining Claim and those upon the 
premises constituting the subject matter of this 
controversy, if the latter be found to have been 
made according to law, shall in no manner be 
regarded as double assessments, but, on the 
contrary, each assessment shall be in itself a 
separate and distinct assessment, cumulative 
rather than double. All right of either party to 
avail themselves of any issue or issues that 
might be raised on the ground of a double 
assessment is hereby waived." (45 Utah at 86-87, 
142 P. at 1119-1120). 
Because of the agreement that the State taxes assessed to and 
paid by the plaintiff were "separate and distinct" from and 
"cumulative" to those paid by the defendants, the Court was not 
called upon to decide whether the State taxes paid by the 
plaintiff included taxes on the surface estate of the portion 
of the mining claims claimed by the defendants within the 
meaning of the statute requiring the payment of "all" lawfully 
assessed taxes in order to establish title by adverse 
possession -- the point that the State assessed taxes include 
taxes on the surface estate and preclude the acquisition of 
title by adverse possession by parties not paying such taxes 
Kpint> the noint ureed bv Royal Street in this case. Rather, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the question presented in Chandler was whether the taxes 
assessed to and paid by the defendants were lawful in form or, 
if not, whether since it was agreed that there were no other 
taxes assessed to the defendants upon the surface estate in 
the two lots claimed by the defendants, the defendants had 
acquired title by adverse possession to the surface of the 
lots. The Court, in affirming judgments in favor of the 
defendants, held that either the assessments to the defendants 
were invalid in form due to indefiniteness and that hence, 
under the agreed statement of facts, no taxes were validly 
assessed against the surface estate in the two lots or that, 
under the agreed statement of facts, the defendants had paid 
the only taxes assessed to them against the surface estate in 
the two lots, and that, in either case, the defendants had 
acquired title by adverse possession. (45 Utah at 88, 142 P. 
4 
at 1120). In Chandler, it was, in effect, agreed that, for 
4. The Chandler opinion contains a discussion seemingly 
approving separate county taxation to an adverse claimant of 
the surface estate of mining claims improved and occupied for 
purposes other than mining and implying that the taxes assessed 
by the State did not include the surface estate in such claims 
(45 Utah at 87, 142 P. at 1120); however, this discussion 
reflects little, if any, consideration of these issues and was 
obviously unnecessary to the decision actually reached by the 
Court. The Court did not need to reach the question of the 
scope of the taxes assessed by the State or the propriety of 
county taxation of the surface estate to an adverse claimant 
because it concluded, under the agreed statement of facts, that 
the county taxes were either invalid due to form or that the 
defendants had paid the only taxes assessed against the surface 
estate in the two lots. (See the further discussion of the 
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the purposes of the statute requiring the payment of "all" 
lawfully assessed taxes in order to establish title by adverse 
possession, the taxes assessed by the State did not include 
the surface estate of the two lots claimed by the defendants or 
preclude the defendants from acquiring title by adverse 
possession. In contrast, in the instant case it is clear that 
the taxes assessed by the State Tax Commission and paid by 
Royal Street's predecessors did include the surface estate in 
the real property claimed by the defendants and must preclude 
the defendants from acquiring title by adverse possession. 
Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman, 47 Utah 165, 152 P. 178 
(1915), which was decided just one year after Chandler by a 
Court composed of the same members as the Chandler Court, 
recognizes the limited scope of the Chandler holding and 
clearly indicates that Chandler is not controlling in this 
case. 
Eckman involved the Mirror Lode Mining Claim and the 
Copper Cent Claim in Bingham Canyon. The plaintiff brought the 
action to recover a portion of the surface area of these mining 
claims, which had been improved and platted into town lots. 
The District Court entered judgment for the defendant and the 
plaintiff appealed. The plaintiff, which was the record owner 
of the mining claims, had paid the taxes assessed on the mining 
claims by the State. The defendants had evidently also paid 
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taxes upon the surface estate of the lots and upon the 
improvements thereon. Unlike Chandler, however, there was no 
agreement as to whether the taxes paid by the plaintiff upon 
the Mirror Lode Mining Claim were assessed upon both the 
surface and the mineral estate in the mining claims and there 
was no agreement that such taxes could be disregarded for 
purposes of the requirement that an adverse claimant pay "all" 
lawfully assessed taxes in order to establish title by adverse 
possession: 
"While it is quite clear that in this case that 
the surface area of the Mirror Lode mining claim 
which is in controversy here was used and 
improved by the defendant for other than mining 
purposes. . . , yet it does not appear that in 
assessing tht mining claim to the appellant . . . 
it was not assessed for all purposes; that is, 
for the purpose of mining claim and also such 
purposes as the surface was devoted to." (47 
Utah at 171, 151 P. at 180). 
This prompted the Court to reverse and remand the case to the 
District Court for further findings: 
"In view that the findings with respect to 
the assessment and payment of taxes are not 
complete, we cannot even affirm the judgment with 
respect to the disputed area of the Mirror lode, 
although, as we have seen, the defendant seems to 
have been in possession of the surface area of 
that lode for the length of time required by our 
statute after the title had passed from the 
United States to acquire title thereto by adverse 
possession." (47 Utah at 173, 152 P. at 181). 
The clear implication of the foregoing is that if the taxes 
assessed on the mining claim by the State were assessed upon 
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both the surface and the mineral estate, the adverse claimant 
might not acquire title by adverse possession without paying 
other taxes upon the land, or even by paying such other 
taxes. 
In this case, the fact that between at least 1939 and 
through 1977 taxes were assessed by the State Tax Commission 
"for both the surface and mineral rights'1 of the mining claims 
necessitates a finding that such taxes were assessed against 
the surface estate of the real property in issue. As 
previously noted, this alone precludes the Reeds from acquiring 
title by adverse possession. 
Indeed, it is not only clear under the facts of this 
case that the taxes assessed by the State Tax Commission were 
assessed against the surface estate; it is clear that no other 
result can be squared with the statutes governing the taxation 
of mining claims and particularly Section 59-5-57 Utah Code 
5. The Eckman decision discusses the Chandler decision, 
characterizing Chandler as approving separate county taxation 
to an adverse claimant of the surface estate of mining claims 
occupied for purposes other than mining and implying that the 
State assessed taxes do not include the surface estate under 
such circumstances. (47 Utah at 171, 152 P. at 180). However, 
as was the case in Chandler itself, the Court in Eckman was 
not presented with this question. (See note 4, supra, and 
the further discussion of the Chandler and Eckman decisions 
infra at pages 28 through 29). 
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Annotated (Repl. Vol. 6B 1974). Section 59-5-57 provides, in 
this regard, that: 
"All metalliferous mines and mining claims, 
both placer and rock in place, shall be assessed 
at $5.00 per acre and in addition thereto at a 
value equal to two times the average net annual 
proceeds thereof for the three calendar years 
next preceding or for as many years next 
preceding as the mine has been operating, 
whichever is less; provided, however, there shall 
be no valuation based upon net annual proceeds 
for the purpose of assesement of any such mine or 
mining claim for any one year in which there were 
no gross proceeds realized in the year next 
preceding the year of assessment. All other 
mines or mining claims and other valuable mineral 
deposits, including lands containing coal or 
hydrocarbons, shall be assessed at thirty per 
cent of their reasonable fair cash value. All 
machinery used in mining and all property or 
surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines 
or mining claims and the value of any surface use 
made of mining claims or mining property for 
other than mining purposes shall be assessed at 
thirty per cent of their reasonable fair cash 
value. In all cases where the surface of lands 
is owned by one person and the mineral estate 
underlying such lands is owned by another, such 
property rights shall be separately assessed to 
the respective owners. In such cases the value 
of the surface if it is used for other than 
mining purposes shall be assessed by the assessor 
of the county in which the property is 
situated." (Emphasis supplied). 
Under Section 59-5-57, the State Tax Commission is 
granted the exclusive authority to tax "mining claims" so long 
as the surface and the mineral estate in the claims are in 
common ownership. Since the legislature obviously intended 
This Section was amended in 1981. However, the 
amendment is of no consequence to this case. 
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that the authority to tax the surface estate in mining claims 
always rest in some taxing authority, it follows that, under 
such circumstances, the State Tax Commission's assessment of 
ffmining claims'1 at the rate of $5.00 per acre includes both the 
surface and the mineral estate of such mining claims. This 
conclusion is also supported by the fact that it is only where 
the surface "is used for other than mining purposes" and where 
the surface and the mineral estate are "owned" by different 
persons that counties are authorized to tax the surface. 
Prior to 1975, the surface and the mineral estate in 
the Trump Millsite, the Goodell Millsite, and the Olive Branch 
Millsite, of which the real property in issue is a part, were 
in common ownership and the taxes assessed by the State Tax 
Commission and paid by Royal Street's predecessors included the 
surface estate in the claims. Only after the ownership of the 
surface estate and the mineral estate were formally severed by 
United Park in 1975 could the assessments made by the State Tax 
Commission have ceased to include the surface estate and only 
then would Summit County have lawfully assessed the surface 
estate. However, the surface estate was then assessed to Royal 
Street. The Reeds undoubtedly used the surface of the real 
property in issue for non-mining purposes, but they never 
"owned" the surface. Their status is and always has been, at 
best, that of claimants to ownership. Moreover, because they 
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did not pay any State assessed taxes and did not and could not 
have paid any lawfully assessed Summit County taxes on the real 
property for a full seven (7) years prior to the commencement 
of this action, they did not pay "all" lawfully assessed taxes 
upon the surface estate and cannot establish title to the 
surface estate by adverse possession. 
Language in Utah Copper Co. v. Chandler, 45 Utah 85, 
142 P. 1119 (1914) and Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman, 47 Utah 165, 
7. In the District Court, the Reeds attempted to make 
something of the fact that the taxes assessed by the State Tax 
Commission were assessed under Section 57-5-57 at the rate of 
$5.00 per acre and did not include a separate assessment for 
"surface improvements" or "the value of [the] surface use . . . 
for other than mining purposes" at the rate of "thirty percent 
of their reasonable fair cash value." See, e.g., R. 
181-183). In this connection, the Reeds argued that Royal 
Street's predecessors should have had the State Tax Commission 
levy additional assessments on the value of the "surface 
improvements" or "surface use" made by the Reeds. However, the 
situation would be no different if the State Tax Commission had 
so assessed Royal Street's predecessors for an additional tax 
on "surface improvements" and "surface uses". In that case, 
there still would have been State taxes lawfully assessed 
against the surface estate and not paid by the Reeds. This 
"point" is therefore of no consequence. Cj:. Telonis v. 
Staley, 104 Utah 537, 541, 144 P.2d 513, 515 (1943), where the 
Court observed that: 
"In this case, Union Pacific Coal Company, grantor 
of plaintiff, owned both the surface and mineral 
rights in the land used for mining purposes. It made 
no request that the surface be taxed on its valuation 
separately from the mines and mineral rights. Owing 
to the common ownership and failure of the owner to 
request separate taxation, it was proper . . . to 
aggregate the valuations of both surface and mineral 
rights in applying the tax levy and in all proceedings 
subsequent thereto." 
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152 P. 178 (1915) appears to approve the separate taxation --
presumably by a county - to an adverse claimant of the surface 
estate of mining claims improved and occupied for purposes 
other than mining and might be incorrectly read to imply that 
the taxes assessed by the State to the record claim owner do 
not extend to the surface estate under such circumstances. (45 
Utah at 87, 142 P. at 1120; 47 Utah at 171, 152 P. at 180). 
However, neither case actually decided that question. In 
Chandler, the Court held that either the assessment to the 
defendants was invalid in form due to indefiniteness and that 
hence, under the agreed statement of facts, no taxes were 
validly assessed against the surface estate or that, under the 
agreed statement of facts, the defendants had paid the only 
taxes assessed to them against the surface estate. (45 Utah at 
88, 142 P. at 1120). The Chandler Court concluded that, in 
either case, the defendants had acquired title by adverse 
possession. (45 Utah at 88, 142 P. at 1120). The Court in 
Eckman merely discussed Chandler in holding that the District 
Court's findings were inadequate to permit it to determine 
whether the taxes assessed to the plaintiff by the State 
included taxes upon both the surface and the mineral estate in 
the Mirror Lode Mining Claim. (47 Utah at 173, 152 P. at 
180-181). 
The issue of the scope of the taxes assessed upon 
mining properties by the State Tax Commission prior to a formal 
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severance of the ownership of the surface and mineral estate in 
the properties appears to have first received express 
consideration by Justice Wolfe in concurring in part in the 
decision in Telonis v. Staley, 104 Utah 505, 525, 106 P.2d 
163, 172 (1940), overruled, 104 Utah 537, 144 P.2d 513 
(1943). Justice Wolfe there noted that the statutes appear to 
authorize separate taxation of the surface estate in a mining 
property or mining claim only where it is "owned" by a person 
other than the record owner of the mineral estate and observed 
that a mere adverse claimant should not be deemed to have an 
ownership interest such as would render a State assessed tax a 
tax only on the mineral estate: 
"Although this court seemingly held' 
differently in Utah Copper v. Chandler, 45 Utah 
85, 142 P. 1119, followed in Utah Copper Company 
v. Eckman, 47 Utah 165, 152 P. 178, to the effect 
that surface rights used for other than mining 
purposes constitute a separate estate, I incline 
to the view that theyare not such until severed 
by the owner by some unequivocal act such as a 
transfer of them to different persons, or 
transferring one and retaining the other. 
Otherwise, difficulties in regard to title by 
adverse possession present themselves." (104 
Utah at 525, 106 P.2d at 172; emphasis supplied). 
Later, writing for the Court in Aggelos v. Zella Mining Co., 
99 Utah 417, 107 P.2d 170 (1940), Justice Wolfe made it clear 
that the Chandler and Eckman decisions were not dispositive 
of the issues: 
"However, in our view of the case we do not 
need to decide whether the assessment by the 
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State Tax Commission of mining claims on the 
basis of a value of $5 per acre, as provided by-
Section 80-5-56, R.S.U. 1933, for unimproved 
mining claims, constitutes a complete assessment 
of the property so that a person claiming either 
the surface or sub-surface rights to that 
property would have to pay the taxes so assessed 
in order to comply with the provisions of Section 
104-2-12, hereinbefore quoted. See Utah Copper 
v. Chandler, 45 Utah 85, 142 P. 1119; and Utah 
Copper Company v. Eckman, 47 Utah 165, 152 P. 178. 
Nor do we need to decide whether an individual 
can by his occupation of the surface of mining 
property and erection of improvements thereon 
cause or initiate by those very acts a separation 
of the surface from the sub-surface right so as 
to necessitate a separate assessment of such 
property rights as provided for by Section 
80-5-56, R.S.U. 1933, on the theory that fthe 
surface of lands is owned by one person [the 
person occupying the same] and the mineral 
underlying such lands is owned by another [the 
person having record title to the mining claim]f 
(see Rio Grande Western Railway Company v. Salt 
Lake Investment Co., 35 Utah 528, 101 P. 586); or 
whether an individual, who has thus caused a 
separate assessment of the surface rights of 
mining property on the theory that such 
individual is the owner of these surface rights 
and pays the taxes so assessed can subsequently 
claim title to the surface rights on the theory 
that he is an adverse claimant who has occupied 
the property and paid the taxes thereon as 
required by the statute. See Rio Grande Western 
Railway Company v. Salt Lake Investment Co., 
supra. (99 Utah at 419, 420, 107 P.2d at 171). 
Rio Grande Western Ry. Co. v. Salt Lake Inv. Co., 35 
Utah 528, 101 P. 586 (1909) is closely analogous to the issues 
in this case and, read in light of the view expressed by 
Justice Wolfe in Telonis v. Staley, 104 Utah 505, 106 P.2d 163 
(1940), overruled, 104 Utah 537, 144 P.2d 513 (1943) and in 
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light of the Aggelos decision, must be read to support the 
conclusion that, in the absence of a formal severance of the 
surface and the mineral estate, the State Tax Commission's 
assessments of mining claims extend to both the surface and the 
mineral estate in such claims and preclude the acquisition of 
title by adverse possession where the party claiming to have 
acquired such title did not pay the State assessed taxes. 
In the Rio Grande case, the plaintiff-railroad and 
the defendant each claimed to be the owner of a strip of real 
property by adverse possession. The plaintiff had listed the 
disputed strip with the State Board of Equalization for 
taxation as railroad property and had paid all taxes assessed 
by the Board. The defendant had paid taxes assessed upon a 
part of the strip by Salt Lake County as "lot 8". The District 
Court entered judgment for the defendant and the plaintiff 
appealed. In affirming the judgment, the Court held that the 
strip was not, in fact, the property of the plaintiff and that 
the plaintiff could not confer authority upon the State Board 
of Equalization to assess the strip merely by listing it as 
railroad property. (35 Utah at 539, 101 P. at 590). The Court 
further held that the plaintiff could not acquire title to the 
strip by adverse possession by paying the taxes assessed by the 
Board because those assessments were invalid and because the 
strip was lawfully assessed by Salt Lake County: 
"From the time it would have obtained title, and 
not before, could the railroad company lawfully 
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list it as railroad property and oust the county 
assessor of jurisdiction. It might be that in 
case property claimed by the railroad company, 
and of which it has possession, was not assessed 
by the local assessor but was assessed by the 
State Board of Equalization, or not assessed at 
all, the railroad company might acquire title by 
adverse possession after the seven-year period. 
This would be so, however, upon the ground that 
the railroad company in such a case would have 
paid all the taxes that were assessed against the 
property. If it were held otherwise, the 
railroad company could claim any one's property 
and have it assessed by the State Board of 
Equalization and pay the taxes thereon as such, 
and thus prevent the individual owner from paying 
the taxes on his own property under the 
description by which it is generally known. No 
doubt appellant could have acquired title by 
adverse possession to all of lot 8 the same as 
any one else could have done, but, in order to 
have done so, it would have been required to pay 
the taxes assessed against lot 8 by that 
description, the same as any one else would have 
been required to pay them. By assessing lot 8 
the parcel in question was always assessed as a 
part of it. Baldwin v. Temple, supra. Appellant 
did not pay the taxes on lot 8 except for the 
year 1906. Upon the other hand, respondent and 
its predecessors in interest, during all of the 
years since 1882, paid the taxes assessed against 
lot 8.?f (35 Utah at 539-540, 101 P. at 590). 
Just as the plaintiff in Rio Grande was not the owner 
of the strip listed by it with the State Board of Equalization, 
the Reeds were not the owners of the surface estate in the real 
property that is the subject of this action when it was first 
assessed to them by Summit County. Just as the plaintiff in 
Rio Grande could not deprive Salt Lake County of its authority 
to assess lot 8 by listing the strip with the Board, the Reeds 
could not deprive the State Tax Commission of its authority to 
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assess the surface estate of the mining claims by their mere 
occupation and use of that part thereof which comprises the 
real property in issue, by obtaining assessments from Summit 
County on that property, or by any other means. Just as the 
plaintiff in Rio Grande could not acquire title by adverse 
possession to the strip without having paid the taxes assessed 
by Salt Lake County, the Reeds could not acquire title by 
adverse possession to the surface estate in the real property 
in issue without having paid the taxes assessed by the State 
Tax Commission. 
The evidence discloses that the Reeds did not satisfy 
the requirements of Section 78-12-12. The Reeds, therefore, 
did not establish title by adverse possession. 
B. SECTION 78-12-5 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (REPL. VOL. 
9A 1977) DOES NOT BAR ROYAL STREET1S ACTION 
Section 78-12-5 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 9A 
1977) provides that: 
"No action for the recovery of real property 
or for the possession thereof shall be 
maintained, unless it appears that the plaintiff, 
his ancestor, grantor or predecessor was seized 
or possessed of the property in question within 
seven years before the commencement of the 
action." (Emphasis supplied). 
Section 78-12-5 requires only that the plaintiff or its 
predecessors be "seized" or "possessed" of the property within 
the seven (7) year period. The Reedsf reliance on the history 
of possession by them and by their tenants and predecessors 
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overlooks the fact that throughout that time Royal Street and 
its predecessors were seized of the property by reason of 
their record ownership of the legal title to the property. 
Because Royal Street and its predecessors were seized of the 
property within the seven (7) year period, Section 78-12-5 
cannot bar Royal Street's action. 
Section 78-12-7 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 9A 
1977) serves to confirm tht Section 78-12-5 is not intended to 
bar an action by a plaintiff holding legal title within the 
seven (7) year period. That Section provides as follows: 
"In every action for the recovery of real 
property, or the possession thereof, the persons 
establishing a legal title to the property shall 
be presumed to have been possessed thereof within 
the time required by law; and the occupation of 
the property by any other person shall be deemed 
to have been under and in subordination to the 
legal title, unless it appears that the property 
has been held and possessed adversely to such 
legal title for seven years before the 
commencement of the action." 
Under Section 78-12-7, the party proving legal title 
is presumed to have had possession and the possession of any 
other party is presumed to have been under and subordinate to 
the legal title. Consequently, a history of possession by 
another party or its predecessors cannot of itself impair the 
legal title of the record owner or operate to bar an action to 
quiet title under Section 78-12-5. Since Royal Street 
unquestionably has legal title to the real property in issue, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
it is presumed to have had possession and its action cannot be 
held barred by Section 78-12-5. 
Moreover, by the very terms of Section 78-12-7, the 
presumption created by the Section cannot be rebutted "unless 
it appears that the property has been held and possessed 
adversely to such legal title for seven years before the 
commencement of the action." In other words, the presumption 
of possession fails to apply only where title by adverse 
possession is proven to exist in the party in possession, and 
title by adverse possession is acquired not through mere 
possession, but through possession and, among other things, 
payment of taxes. See, e.g., Keller v. Chournos, 102 Utah 
535, 545, 133 P.2d 318, 323 (1943) (ten years1 possession did 
not bar action where taxes paid for only a four year period 
before action commenced); Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 
231, 26 P. 291, 292-293 (1891): 
"The statute does not, in effect, presume a 
grant and give the person relying upon it the 
title from seven years' possession alone. The 
presumption is made from the fact that the land 
is held adversely; and to make the holding 
adverse the land must have been protected by a 
substantial inclosure, or it must have been 
usually cultivated and improved, or labor or 
money must have been expended to irrigate it, 
amounting to the sum of five dollars per acre. 
And in either case the occupation and claim must 
have been continuous for the seven years and 
during that time the claimant, his predecessors 
or grantors, must have paid all taxes levied and 
assessed upon the land according to law." 
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The foregoing compels the conclusion that Section 
78-12-5 can never be held to bar a quiet title action by a 
party holding legal record title unless the opposing party 
actually succeeds in proving title by adverse possession. 
Royal Street is aware of no holding to the contrary. 
Indeed, the tax title statute, Section 78-12-5.1 Utah 
Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 9A 1977) supports the foregoing 
analysis. Section 78-12-5.1 provides in pertinent part, that: 
"No action for the recovery of real property 
or for the possession thereof shall be 
maintained, unless the plaintiff or his 
predecessor was seized or possessed of such 
property within seven years from the commencement 
of such action; provided, however, that with 
respect to actions or defenses brought or 
interposed for the recovery or possession of or 
to quiet title or determine the ownership of real 
property against the holder of a tax title to 
such property, no such action or defense shall be 
commenced or interposed more than four years 
after the date of the tax deed, conveyance or 
transfer creating such tax title unless the 
person commencing or interposing such action or 
defense or his predecessor has actually occupied 
or been in possession of such property within 
four years prior to the commencement or 
interposition of such action or defense. . . . " 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
The language emphasized above serves to contrast the 
requirements applicable under Section 78-12-5.1 to actions 
challenging tax titles and those applicable under Section 
78-12-5 to other actions, including this action. Section 
78-12-5.1 bars an action if the plaintiff or its predecessors 
were not "seized or possessed" of the property and had not 
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fyactually occupied or been in possession of such property 
. • . ." (Emphasis supplied.) Section 78-12-5, in contrast, 
bars an action only if the plaintiff or its predecessors were 
not "seized or possessed" of the property. The requirements of 
Section 78-12-5.1 are more rigorous than those of 78-12-5. 
Mere occupancy and use by an opposing party will bar an action 
challenging a tax title under Section 78-12-5.1. Obviously, if 
the legislature had intended that mere occupancy and use by an 
opposing party bar other actions under 78-12-5, it could 
readily have so provided. The fact that the legislature did 
not so provide is itself strongly supportive of Royal Street's 
position. Further support of Royal Street's position can be 
found in this Court's analysis in the recent case of 
Fredericksen v. LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827, 831-832 (Utah 1981). 
Finally, it is a fundamental precept that a party 
claiming title in a quiet title action must establish title in 
itself and cannot merely assert defects in its opponent's 
title. See, e.g., Homeowners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 
supra. This precept would be directly violated if the Court 
were to hold this action barred under Section 78-12-5 despite 
the fact that the Reeds cannot prove that they have title by 
adverse possession. 
Section 78-12-5, therefore, does not bar Royal 
Street's action. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REJECTING CERTAIN OF 
ROYAL STREET'S OBJECTIONS TO THE FORM OF THE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
For the reasons explained in part "I" of the 
"Argument" portion of this Opening Brief, the Summary Judgment 
appealed from must be reversed and the District Court must be 
directed to enter judgment against the Reeds and in favor of 
Royal Street. While those reasons appear to be unassailable 
and to require that result, Royal Street asks, in the 
alternative, that this Court remand this case to the District 
Court for further proceedings. The principal grounds for this 
alternative request for relief are that the District Court 
erred in rejecting those of Royal Street's objections to the 
form of the Summary Judgment which asserted (a) that the Reeds 
had failed to show the payment of any taxes on the property 
that they actually claimed and (b) that a portion of this 
property actually claimed by the Reeds had been dedicated by 
Royal Street to Park City as a roadway. 
A. THE OBJECTION THAT THE REEDS FAILED TO SHOW THE 
PAYMENT OF ANY TAXES ON THE PROPERTY THAT THEY 
ACTUALLY CLAIMED 
As previously noted, at the time that the District 
Court entered its minute entry denying Royal Street's Motion 
and granting the Reeds' renewed Motion, the District Court was 
unaware that the property actually claimed by the Reeds was not 
that described in Royal Street's original Complaint. Since the 
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only taxes paid by the Reeds upon real property were paid upon 
a property description identical to that appearing in Royal 
Street's original Complaint, the District Court no doubt 
assumed that the Reeds had paid at least some taxes upon the 
real property in issue. 
From all that appears, the District Court never really 
confronted the fact that the Reeds had not paid any taxes on 
the property that they actually claimed. If this Court for 
some reason is not otherwise able to hold for Royal Street on 
the adverse possession issue, it ought, at the very least, to 
remand this case to the District Court to permit it to consider 
this fact. 
B. THE OBJECTION BASED UPON THE DEDICATION BY ROYAL 
STREET TO PARK CITY 
Because Royal Street's original Complaint did not 
describe the property actually claimed by the Reeds, the 
District Court was also not apprised that Royal Street had 
dedicated a portion of that property to Park City at the time 
that it entered its minute entry denying Royal Street's Motion 
and granting the Reeds' renewed Motion. Since Park City was 
not a party to this case, the District Court's judgment 
obviously could not determine rights claimed by Park City. 
Furthermore, in light of the dedication, it would appear that 
Park City and not Royal Street would be the proper party to the 
action with respect to the dedicated property. 
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Since the District Court never really confronted this 
issue, this Court should remand this case in order to permit 
consideration of this issue by the District Court or to permit 
the modification of the Summary Judgment to exclude the 
dedicated property. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Summary Judgment 
appealed from must be reversed and the District Court must be 
directed to enter judgment against the Reeds and in favor of 
Royal Street. In the alternative, this Court should remand 
this case to the District Court for further proceedings. 
DATED this \^i day of December, 1983. 
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